Complexity and Efficiency in Repeated Games and Negotiation by Lee, Jihong & Sabourian, Hamid
	


				

 !""#
$%"#&'
	

Complexity and Efficiency
in Repeated Games with Negotiation
Jihong Lee
Birkbeck College, London and Trinity College, Cambridge∗
Hamid Sabourian
King’s College, Cambridge†
March 2004
Abstract
This paper considers the “negotiation game” (Busch and Wen [4]) which com-
bines the features of two-person alternating offers bargaining and repeated games.
Despite the forces of bargaining, the negotiation game in general admits a large
number of equilibria some of which involve delay in agreement and inefficiency. In
order to isolate equilibria in this game, we explicitly consider the complexity of
implementing a strategy, introduced in the literature on repeated games played by
automata. It turns out that when the players have a preference for less complex
strategies (even at the margin) only efficient equilibria survive. Thus, complexity
and bargaining in tandem may offer an explanation for co-operation in repeated
games.
JEL Classification: C72, C78
Keywords: Negotiation Game, Repeated Game, Bargaining, Complexity, Bounded
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1 Introduction
Busch and Wen [4], henceforth referred to as BW, analyze the following game. In each
period, two players bargain - in Rubinstein’s alternating-offers protocol - over the distri-
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bution of a fixed and commonly known periodic surplus. If an offer is accepted, the game
ends and each player gets his share of the surplus according to the agreement at every
period thereafter. After any rejection, but before the game moves to the next period,
the players engage in a normal form game to determine their payoffs for the period. The
Pareto frontier of the disagreement game is contained in the bargaining frontier. We
shall refer to this game as the “negotiation game”.
The negotiation game generally admits a large number (continuum) of subgame-
perfect equilibria, as summarized by BW in a result that has a same flavor as the
Folk theorem in repeated games. BW show that only the structure of the disagreement
game, and not the gains from the agreement, determines multiplicity and the range of
payoffs that can be sustained as credible equilibria. Moreover, they show that, provided
the players are sufficiently patient, the negotiation game in general has a continuum
of equilibria which will involve delay in agreement (even perpetual disagreement) and
inefficiency.
The negotiation game and its equilibria can be interpreted from two alternative view-
points. Naturally, we can think of the game as a standard alternating-offers bargaining
game with endogenous disagreement payoffs.1 In fact, Fernandez and Glazer [7] (and also
Haller and Holden [11]) derive much of the insights in a well-known application of the
game along this bargaining interpretation. They consider the standoff between a union
and a firm. During a contract renewal process, a union and a firm renegotiate over the
distribution of a periodic revenue, but a disagreement puts them in a strategic situation.
After rejecting the firm’s wage offer or having their own offer rejected by the firm, the
union can forego the status quo wage for one period and strike before a counter-offer
is made next period. (The firm is inactive in the disagreement game.) Fernandez and
Glazer’s characterization of subgame-perfect equilibria in this specific setting contains
many of the salient features of the equilibria in the general game, and thus, offers an
explanation as to why such socially wasteful activities as strikes may take place even in
a situation where the agents are completely rational and have complete information.
The alternative viewpoint focuses on the repeated game aspect of the negotiation
game (and this is the interpretation we want to emphasize in the paper). Real world
repeated interactions are often accompanied by negotiations which can lead to mutual
agreement. While equilibria in standard repeated games are usually given the interpre-
tation of implicit, self-enforcing agreements, the situations depicted by the negotiation
game are associated with the possibility of explicit contracts that can bind the players to
a particular set of outcomes. For example, we observe firms engaged in a repeated hor-
izontal or vertical relationship negotiating over a long-term contract, or even a merger.
Similarly, countries involved in international trade often attempt to settle an agreement
1The issue of endogenous disagreement payoffs in a bargaining situation goes back at least to Nash
[14] who considers the problem in a co-operative framework.
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that enforces fixed quotas and tariffs.
The Folk theorem gives economic theorists little hope of making any predictions in
repeated interactions. However, as the aforementioned examples suggest, it seems that
negotiation is often a salient feature of real world repeated interactions, presumably to
enforce co-operation and efficient outcomes. Can bargaining be used to isolate equilibria
in repeated games? Unfortunately, the contributions of BW and others demonstrate
that Folk theorem type results with a large number of equilibria ( involving delay and
inefficiency) may persist even when the players are endowed with an opportunity at the
beginning of each period to settle on an efficient outcome once and for all.
In order to enrich this line of enquiry, on the issue of how bargaining can be used
to select (efficient) equilibria in repeated games, this paper departs from the standard
rationality paradigm and introduces the notion of complexity into the negotiation game.
Our central message is that the equilibrium strategies supporting inefficient outcomes in
this game are unnecessarily too complex to implement. Bargaining combined with the
players’ preference for less complex strategies (even at the margin) select only efficient
outcomes in the repeated game (at least if the players are sufficiently patient).
There are many different ways of defining the complexity of a strategy. In the lit-
erature on repeated games played by automata the number of states of the machine
is often used as a measure of complexity (Rubinstein [19], Abreu and Rubinstein [1],
Piccione [17] and Piccione and Rubinstein [18]). This is because the set of states of the
machine can be regarded as a partition of possible histories. In particular, Kalai and
Stanford [13] show that the counting-states measure of complexity, henceforth referred
to as state complexity, is equivalent to looking at at the number of continuation strategies
that the strategy induces at different histories of the game. We extend this notion of
strategic complexity to the negotiation game, and facilitate the analysis by considering
an equivalent “machine game”.
The alternating-offers bargaining imposes an asymmetric structure on the negotiation
game which is stationary only every two periods (henceforth we shall refer to every two
periods as a “stage”). To account for such structural asymmetry of the game, we shall
adopt machine specifications that formally distinguish between the different roles played
by each player in a given stage. A player can be either proposer or responder. In the
main specification used in the analysis, a machine consists of two “sub-machines”, each
playing a role (of a proposer or a responder) with distinct states, output and transition
functions. Transition occurs at the end of each period, from a state belonging to one
sub-machine to a state belonging to the other sub-machine as roles are reversed.
We first demonstrate that the result of Kalai and Stanford [13] holds for our spec-
ification of machines. The total number of states used by each sub-machine under this
specification is equivalent to measuring the total number of continuation strategies that
the implemented strategy induces at the beginning of each period.
The concept of Nash equilibrium is then refined to incorporate the players’ prefer-
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ence for less complex strategies. In our choice of equilibrium notions, complexity enters
a player’s preferences, together with the payoffs in the underlying game, either lexico-
graphically or as a positive fixed cost c. The larger this cost is, the more is required of
complexity. We can thus interpret it as a measure of the players’ “bounded rationality”.
We will refer to a Nash equilibrium (of the machine game) with fixed complexity cost
c by NEMc and adopt the convention of using c = 0 (and thus NEM0) to refer to the
lexicographic case. We also invoke the notion of subgame-perfection and consider the set
of NEMc that are subgame-perfect, referred to as SPEMc.
The selection result is as follows. We first show that, independently of the degree
of complexity cost and discount factor, if an agreement occurs in some finite period as
the outcome of some NEMc then it must occur within the very first stage of the game,
and moreover, the players’ equilibrium strategies are stationary (history-independent).
Thus, in this case any NEMc outcome is efficient in the limit as the discount factor goes
to one.
We then establish the following results on the set of SPEMc profiles when the players
are sufficiently patient:
1. For c = 0 (lexicographic preferences),
(i) every SPEM0 of the negotiation game that induces an agreement is stationary
and hence (almost) efficient;
(ii) every SPEM0 of the negotiation game that induces perpetual disagreement is
at least long-run (almost) efficient ; that is, the players must reach a finite period
in which the continuation game then on is (almost) efficient.
2. For any c > 0, every SPEMc of the negotiation game is stationary and hence
(almost) efficient.
This implies that we can draw a yet stronger set of conclusions under certain disagree-
ment game structures (given sufficiently high discounting). For example, if every dis-
agreement game outcome is dominated by an agreement, it is not possible to have a
SPEMc (for any c ≥ 0) involving perpetual disagreement. Thus, every equilibrium out-
come in this case must reach an agreement in the first stage of the negotiation game,
and hence, is stationary and (almost) efficient.
We also explore an alternative machine specification that employs more frequent
transitions and hence account for finer partitions of histories and continuation strate-
gies. This machine consists of four sub-machines; while keeping the role distinction,
transition occurs twice in each period at the end of bargaining and at the end of the dis-
agreement game. Using this machine specification, we derive a set of SPEMc results that
contain much the same flavor as the corresponding results under the two sub-machine
specification, but are sharper; the discount factor is now immaterial. Specifically, the
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results in 1 and 2 above hold for any discount factor and the efficiency property therein
is no longer restricted to the limit case.2
Our contribution thus takes the study of complexity in repeated games a step fur-
ther from the existing literature in which complexity has yielded only a limited selec-
tive power. While many inefficient equilibria survive complexity refinement in standard
repeated games (Abreu and Rubinstein [1])3, we demonstrate that complexity and bar-
gaining in tandem offer an explanation for why only co-operation and efficiency can be
expected to arise out of repeated interactions.
There have been extensive and wide-ranging approaches at restricting the unwield-
ily large set of equilibria resulting from the Folk theorem. Among these attempts, one
literature motivates the notion of bargaining and negotiation by invoking the idea that
punishments that are inefficient may be vulnerable to renegotiation and hence not credi-
ble. This literature suggests a solution concept based on renegotiation-proofness.4. There
are two differences between this line of research and the negotiation game. First, the for-
mer takes a “black box” approach to renegotiation. Unlike in the negotiation game, the
process of (re)negotiation is not explicitly modelled; rather, the renegotiation arguments
are embedded in the additional restrictions imposed on an equilibrium. Secondly, the
renegotiation literature does not allow for binding agreements.
We also want to mention several recent papers that have rekindled the issue of
complexity in equilibrium selection, and in particular, demonstrated that complexity
drives efficient outcomes in some specific games. Chatterjee and Sabourian [5][6] consider
the multi-person Rubinstein bargaining game, and Sabourian [20], Gale and Sabourian
[9][10] consider market games with matching and bargaining. (These papers are also in-
terested in other issues such as the uniqueness of the equilibrium set and the competitive
nature of equilibria in the case of the market games.) In contrast to the present paper,
however, these papers build upon a different notion of strategic complexity. They con-
sider the complexity of response rules within a period. A simple response rule according
to their notion of response complexity uses only the information available in the current
period and not the history of play up to the period. Introducing this (together with state
complexity in Sabourian [20]) delivers the efficiency results in those games.
The paper is organized as follows. In the following section, we describe the negotiation
game and BW’s main results. We then introduce the notion of complexity in terms
of strategies and machines. The machine game will be described. Section 4 presents
the main analysis and results. We then run the analogous results with an alternative,
2These results are also associated with a slightly different (stricter) notion of a stationary strategy.
3Abreu and Rubinstein [1] show that complexity refinement narrows the set of equilibrium payoffs
in 2 × 2 repeated games. But, in other repeated games complexity by itself does not have any bite at
all. (See Bloise [3] who shows robust examples of two-player repeated games in which the set of Nash
equilibria with complexity costs coincides with the set of individually rational payoffs.)
4See Pearce [16] and Chapter 5.4 of Fudenberg and Tirole [8] for a survey.
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more elaborate machine specification in Section 5. We finally conclude. The appendices
contain some relegated proofs and also explains that the equilibrium concept we use
closely parallels that of Abreu and Rubinstein [1].
2 The Negotiation Game
Let us formally describe the negotiation game, as defined by BW. There are two players
indexed by i = 1, 2. In the alternating-offers protocol, each player in turn proposes a
partition of a periodic surplus whose value is normalized to one. If the offer is accepted,
the game ends and the players share the surplus accordingly at every period indefi-
nitely thereafter. If the offer is rejected, the players engage in a one-shot (normal form)
game, called the “disagreement game”, before moving onto the next period in which the
rejecting player makes a counter-offer.
We index the (potentially infinite) time periods by t = 1, 2, . . . and adopt the conven-
tion that player 1 makes offers in odd periods and player 2 makes offers in even periods.
Let 42 ≡ {x = (x1, x2) |
∑
i xi = 1} be a partition of the unit periodic surplus. A period
then refers to a single offer x ∈ 42 by one player, a response made by the other player -
acceptance “Y ” or rejection “N” - and the play of the disagreement game if the response
is rejection. The common discount factor is δ ∈ (0, 1).
The disagreement game is a two-player normal form game, defined as
G = {A1, A2, u1(·), u2(·)}
where Ai is the set of player i’s actions and ui(·) : A1×A2 → R is his payoff function in
the disagreement game. We shall denote the set of action profiles in G by A = A1 × A2
with its element indexed by a.5 Let u(·) = (u1(·), u2(·)) be the vector of payoff functions,
and assume that it is bounded. Each player’s minmax payoff in G is normalized to zero.
Also, we assume that for any a ∈ A
u1(a) + u2(a) ≤ 1 .
Therefore, the bargaining offers the players an opportunity to settle on an efficient
outcome once and for all.
Two types of outcome paths are possible in the negotiation game; one in which an
agreement occurs in a finite time, and one in which disagreement continues perpetually.
Let T denote the end of the negotiation game and at ∈ A the disagreement game outcome
(action profile) in period t < T . If T =∞, we mean an outcome path in which agreement
5The normal form may involve sequential moves. In this case, Ai will represent player i’s set of
strategies, rather than actions, in the disagreement game.
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is never reached. Player i’s (discounted) average payoff in this case is equal to
(1− δ)
∞∑
t=1
δt−1ui(at) .
If T <∞, denote the agreed partition in T by z = (z1, z2) ∈ 42. Player i’s payoff from
such an outcome path amounts to
(1− δ)
T−1∑
t=1
δt−1ui
(
at
)
+ δT−1zi .
The negotiation game is stationary only every two periods (beginning with an odd
one) or “stage”. In specifying the players’ strategies (and later machines), we shall for-
mally distinguish between the different roles played by each player in each stage game.
He can be either the proposer (p) or the responder (r) in a given period. We shall index
a player’s role by k. The role distinction provides a natural framework to capture the
structural asymmetry that the alternating offers bargaining imposes on the repeated
(disagreement) game.
In order to define a strategy, we first need to introduce some further notations. We
shall use the following notational convention. Whenever superscripts/subscripts i and j
both appear in the same exposition, we mean i, j = 1, 2 and i 6= j. Similarly, whenever
we use superscripts/subscripts k and l together, we mean k, l = p, r and k 6= l.
We shall denote by e a history of outcomes in a period of the negotiation game, and
this belongs to the set
E = {(xi, Y ), (xi, N, a)}xi∈42,a∈A,i=1,2
where the superscript i represents the identity of the proposer in the period. Let et be
the outcome of the period t.
We also need notation to represent information available to a player within a period
when it is his turn to take an action given his role. To this end, we define a “partial
history” (information within a period) d as an element in the following set
D = {∅, (xi), (xi, N)}xi∈42,i=1,2
For example, the null set ∅ here refers to the beginning of a period at which the proposer
has to make an offer; (xi, N) represents a partial history of an offer xi by player i followed
by the other player’s rejection.
Also, let us define
Dik ≡ {d ∈ D | it is i’s turn to play in role k after d in the period}
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Thus, we have
Dip = {∅, (xi, N)}xi∈42
and
Dir = {(xj), (xj, N)}xj∈42 .
We denote the set of actions available to player i in the negotiation game by
Ci ≡ 42 ∪ Y ∪N ∪ Ai .
Let us denote by Cik(d) the set of actions available to player i given his role k and a
corresponding partial history d ∈ Dik. Thus, we have
Cip(d) =
{
∆2 if d = ∅
Ai if d = (x
i, N)
and
Cir(d) =
{ {Y,N} if d = xj
Ai if d = (x
j, N)
Let
H t = E × · · · × E︸ ︷︷ ︸
t times
be the set of all possible histories of outcomes over t periods in the negotiation game,
excluding those that have resulted in an agreement. The initial history is empty (trivial)
and denoted by H1 = ∅. Let H∞ ≡ ∪∞t=1H t denote the set of all possible finite period
histories.
For the analysis, we shall divide H∞ into two smaller subsets according to the differ-
ent roles that the players play in each stage. LetH tik be the set of all possible histories over
t periods after which player i’s role is k. Notice that H tik = H
t
jl. Also, let H
∞
ik = ∪∞t=1H tik.
Thus, H∞ = H∞ip ∪H∞ir (i = 1, 2).
A strategy for player i is then a function
fi : (H
∞
ip ×Dip) ∪ (H∞ir ×Dir)→ Ci
such that for any (h, d) ∈ H∞ik ×Dik we have fi(h, d) ∈ Cik(d). The set of all strategies
for player i is denoted by Fi. Also, we shall denote by F
t
i the set of player i’s strategies
in the negotiation game starting with role distribution given in period t. Thus, if t is
odd, F ti = Fi.
We can define a stationary (or history-independent) strategy in the following way.
Definition 1 A strategy fi is stationary if and only if fi(h, d) = fi(h
′, d) ∀h, h′ ∈ H∞ik
and ∀d ∈ Dik for k = p, r. A strategy profile f = (fi, f−i) is stationary if fi is stationary
for all i.
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The behavior induced by such a strategy may depend on the partial history within the
current period but not on the history of the game up to the period. For instance, if a
strategy fi is stationary, then it must be such that
fi(h, x,N) = fi(h
′, x,N) ∀h, h′ ∈ H∞ ∀x ∈ 42
but we may have
fi(h, x,N) 6= fi(h, x′, N) for x 6= x′ .
Notice also that a stationary strategy profile always induces the same outcome in each
stage of the game.
In the spirit of the Folk theorem, BW characterize the set of all subgame-perfect
equilibrium (SPE) payoffs of the negotiation game. BW, to this end, compute the lower
bound of each player’s SPE payoff in the negotiation game with discount factor δ.
Define
wj = max
a∈A
{
uj(a)−
[
max
a′i∈Ai
ui(a
′
i, aj)− ui(a)
]}
which BW assume to be well-defined. Note also that wi ≤ 1 given the assumption that
ui(a) ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ A, and wi ≥ 0 if G has at least one Nash equilibrium.
Then, the infimum of player i’s SPE payoffs in the negotiation game beginning with
his offer (given δ) is not less than
vi(δ) =
1− wj
1 + δ
while the infimum of the other player’s SPE payoffs in the same game is not less than
vj(δ) =
δ(1− wi)
1 + δ
.
BW show that, provided the players are sufficiently patient, there exists a SPE of the
negotiation game (beginning with i’s offer) in which the players obtain these lower
bounds.
Define the limit of these infima as δ goes to unity by
vi =
1− wj
2
and vj =
1− wi
2
.
We can now formally state the BW’s main Theorem.
BW Theorem For any payoff vector (v1, v2) of the negotiation game such that v1 > v1
and v2 > v2, ∃ δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that ∀δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), (v1, v2) is a SPE payoff vector of
the negotiation game with discount factor δ.
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The forces of bargaining thus restrict the set of feasible equilibrium payoffs in the
negotiation game compared to the set of individually rational payoffs in the disagree-
ment (repeated) game. But, if v1 + v2 < 1, the negotiation game has many inefficient
subgame-perfect equilibria much in the way the Folk theorem characterizes the repeated
game (even when the disagreement game payoffs are always uniformly small relative to
agreement). The negotiation game has a unique (efficient) SPE payoff if v1 + v2 = 1 or
w1 = w2 = 0 which implies that any Nash equilibrium payoff vector of the disagreement
game has to coincide with its minmax point.
3 Complexity, Machines, and Equilibrium
There are many alternative ways to think of the “complexity” of a strategy in dynamic
games. One natural and intuitive way to measure strategic complexity, which we shall
adopt in the paper, is to consider the total number of distinct continuation strategies
that the strategy induces at different histories (Kalai and Stanford [13]).
In a repeated game, it is natural to take the measure over all its possible subgames.
In the negotiation game, each stage game consists of an extensive form game and this
means that several different definitions are possible.
In the main analysis, we shall consider the set of all continuation strategies at the
beginning of each period of the negotiation game. Formally, let fi|h be the continuation
strategy at history h ∈ H∞ induced by fi ∈ Fi. Thus,
fi|h(h′, d) = fi(h, h′, d) for any (h, h′, d) ∈ H∞ik ×Dik for any k .
Also, let us define the set of all such continuation strategies by Fi(fi) = {fi|h : h ∈ H∞}.
Then the cardinality of this set provides a measure of strategic complexity. Let us call
it comp(fi).
The set of continuation strategies can also be divided into smaller sets according to
the role specification. Define Fik(fi) = {fi|h : h ∈ H∞ik } such that we have Fi(fi) =
∪kFik(fi). Complexity can then be equivalently measured by comp(fi) =
∑
k |Fik(fi)|.
We can also measure complexity over finer partitions of histories and corresponding
continuation strategies. We shall later show that the exact definition of complexity is
going to play some role in shaping the precise details of the results.
In dynamic games any strategy can be implemented by an automaton or a “machine”
(we shall clarify this statement below in our negotiation game context). Moreover, Kalai
and Stanford [13] show that in repeated games the above notion of complexity of a
strategy (the number of continuation strategies) is equivalent to counting the number of
states of the (smallest) automaton that implements the strategy. Thus, one could equiv-
alently describe any result either in terms of underlying strategies and their complexity
(comp(·)) or in terms of machines and their number of states.
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We shall establish below that this equivalence between the two representations of
strategic complexity also holds in the negotiation game. Our approach to complexity
will then be facilitated in machine terms as this will provide a more economical platform
to present the analysis of complexity. Each player’s strategy space in the negotiation
game will then be taken as the set of all machines and the players simultaneously and
independently choose a single machine at the beginning of the negotiation game. This
is the “machine game”, a term which we shall interchangeably use with the negotiation
game.
Here again, the extensive form of the stage game allows for many different machine
specifications to equivalently represent a strategy. (The same is also the case in other
sequential dynamic games; see Piccione and Rubinstein [18], Chatterjee and Sabourian
[5][6] and Sabourian [20]). The fact that the stage game is also asymmetric across its
two periods - a player switches his role in the bargaining process - adds to this issue of
multiple possible machine specifications.
In this paper, we present two particular machine specifications. We choose to run the
analysis first with the simpler of the two. The results are in fact sharper under the other
specification, but our chosen order of analysis will serve to strengthen the expositional
flow. As we shall see later, counting the number of states for these machines corresponds
precisely to the manner in which we divide the histories and accordingly define the notion
of complexity in terms of (continuation) strategies.
The following defines a machine that employs two “sub-machines”.
Definition 2 (Two sub-machine (2SM) specification) For each player i, a ma-
chine (automaton),Mi = {Mip,Mir}, consists of two sub-machinesMip = (Qip, q1ip, λip, µip)
and Mir = (Qir, q
1
ir, λir, µir) where for any k, l = p, r
Qik is the set of states;
q1ik is the initial state belonging to Qik;
λik : Qik ×Dik → Ci is the output function such that
λik(qik, d) ∈ Cik(d), ∀qik ∈ Qik and ∀d ∈ Dik; and
µik : Qik × E → Qil is the transition function.
Let Φi denote the set of player i’s machines in the machine game. We also let Φ
t
i
denote the set of player i’s machines in the machine game starting with role distribution
given in period t. Thus, if t is odd, Φti = Φi.
Each sub-machine in the above definition of a machine consists of a set of distinct
states, an initial state and an output function enabling a player to play a given role.
Transitions take place at the end of each period from a state in one sub-machine to a
state in the other sub-machine as roles are reversed each period.
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We shall assume that each sub-machine has to have at least one state.6 But notice
that we do not assume finiteness of a machine; each sub-machine may have any arbitrary
(possibly infinite) number of states. This is in contrast to Abreu and Rubinstein [1] and
others who consider finite automata. Assuming that machines can only have a finite
number of states is itself a restriction on the players’ choice of strategies.
Notice also that the initial state of the sub-machine that operates in the second
period is in fact redundant because the first state used by this sub-machine depends on
the transition taking place between the first two periods of the game. Nevertheless, we
endow both sub-machines with an initial state for expositional ease.
Let us now formally state what we mean by a machine implementing a strategy in
the negotiation game. Consider a machine Mi = {Mip,Mir} ∈ Φi where, for k = p, r,
Mik = (Qik, q
1
ik, λik, µik). For every k = p, r and for any h ∈ H∞ik , denote the state at
history h by qi(h) ∈ Qik. Formally if h = (e1, . . . , et−1) then qi(h) = qti where for any
0 < τ ≤ t, qτi is defined inductively by
q1i =
{
q1ik if i is in role k initially at t = 1
q1il if i is in role l initially at t = 1
and for τ > 0
qτi ≡
{
µil(q
τ−1
i , e
τ−1) if i is in role k at τ
µik(q
τ−1
i , e
τ−1) if i is in role l at τ
Definition 3 Mi implements fi if ∀k, ∀h ∈ H∞ik and d ∈ Dik we have
λik(qi(h), d) = fi(h, d)
where qi(h) is defined inductively as above.
Clearly, any strategy fi can be implemented by a machine. For example, consider a
machine Mi = {Mip,Mir} (where, for k = p, r, Mik = (Qik, q1ik, λik, µik)) which is such
that ∀k, ∀h ∈ H∞ik , ∀d ∈ Dik and ∀e ∈ E
Qik = H
∞
ik , λik(h, d) = fi(h, d), µik(h, e) = (h, e),
and q1ik′ = ∅ where k′ is i’s role in period t = 1. Evidently, this machine implements fi.
The following defines a minimal machine.
Definition 4 A machine is minimal if and only if each of its sub-machines has exactly
one state.
6We could also define a distinct terminal state for each sub-machine. This is immaterial. We are
assuming that if an offer is accepted by the responder, Mi enters the terminal state of the relevant
sub-machine and shuts off.
12
A minimal machine implements the same actions in every period regardless of the history
of the preceding periods, provided that the partial history within the current period
(given a role) is the same. Thus, it corresponds to a stationary strategy as in Definition 1.
We shall henceforth refer to a minimal machine (profile) interchangeably as a stationary
machine (profile).
We have thus far established that machines and strategies are equivalent in the
negotiation game. Now let us formally show that comp(fi) is equivalent to counting
the total number of states of the machine that implements the strategy fi. It must be
stressed here that the exact specification of a machine is important in qualifying this
statement. In fact, it is precisely to establish this equivalence that we have chosen the
above machine specification.7
Let ‖Mi‖ =
∑
k |Qik| be the total number of states (or size) of machine Mi. We now
establish that the cardinality of the set of continuation strategies that a strategy induces
at the beginning of each period of the negotiation game corresponds to the size of the
smallest machine implementing the strategy.
Proposition 1 For every fi ∈ Fi letMi(fi) ⊆ Φi be the set of machines that implement
fi. Also, let M¯i = {M¯ip, M¯ir} be a smallest machine that implements fi; that is
‖M¯i‖ ∈ {Mi ∈Mi(fi) | ‖Mi‖ ≤ ‖M ′i | ∀M ′i ∈Mi(fi)} .
Then, we have |Fik(fi)| = ‖M¯ik‖ for any k = p, r and thus ‖M¯i‖ = comp(fi).
Proof. The proof is a direct application of the proof of Theorem 1 in Kalai and
Stanford [13]. For ease of exposition, it is relegated to Appendix A. ‖
Given this result, we now formally define the notion of complexity in terms of ma-
chines, as adopted in the literature on repeated games played by automata a` la Rubin-
stein [19] and Abreu and Rubinstein [1].8
Definition 5 (State complexity) A machine M ′i is more complex than another ma-
chine Mi if ‖M ′i‖ > ‖Mi‖.
7Since in defining comp(fi) we consider continuation strategies at the beginning of each period, we
need transitions between the states of a machine to take place between periods in accordance with the
continuation points chosen. It is also important that each sub-machine uses its own distinct set of states.
8We also draw attention to the work of Binmore, Piccione, and Samuelson [2] who propose another
notion of complexity similar to state complexity considered in this paper and others. According to their
“collapsing state condition”, an automatonM1 is less complex than another automatonM2 if the same
implementation can be obtained by consolidating a collection of states belonging to M2 into a single
state in M1. It will not be difficult to see that our results will also hold under this notion of complexity.
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To wrap up the description of the machine game, let us fix some more notational
conventions. Let M = (M1,M2) be a machine profile. Then, if M is the chosen machine
profile, T (M) refers to the end of the negotiation game; z(M) ∈ 42 is the agreement
offer if T (M) <∞; at(M) ∈ A is the disagreement game outcome in period t < T (M);
and qti(M) is the state of player i’s machine appearing in period t ≤ T (M) (the state of
the active sub-machine in period t).
Similarly, we denote by piti(M) player i’s (discounted) average continuation payoff at
period t ≤ T (M) when the machine profile M is chosen. Thus,
piti(M) =

(1− δ)∑∞τ=t δτ−tui(aτ (M)) if T (M) =∞
(1− δ)∑T−1τ=t δτ−tui (aτ (M)) + δT−tzi(M) if t < T (M) <∞
zi(M) if t = T (M) <∞
We shall use the abbreviation pii(M) = pi
1
i (M).
For ease of exposition, the argument in M will sometimes be dropped when we refer
to one of these variables that depends on the particular machine profile. For example,
piti will refer to pi
t
i(M). Unless otherwise stated, the abbreviated variable will refer to the
machine profile in the claim.
We now introduce an equilibrium notion that captures the players’ preference for less
complex machines. (The following definition can be written equivalently in terms of un-
derlying strategies.) There are several ways of refining Nash equilibrium with complexity.
We choose an equilibrium notion in which complexity enters a player’s preferences after
the payoffs and with a (non-negative) fixed cost c.9
To facilitate this concept, we first define the notion of ²-best response.
Definition 6 For any ² ≥ 0, a machine Mi is a ²-best response to M−i if, ∀M ′i ,
pii(Mi,M−i) + ² ≥ pii(M ′i ,M−i) .
If a machine is a 0-best response, then it is a best response in the conventional sense.
Using this, we define a Nash equilibrium of the machine game with complexity cost
c.
Definition 7 A machine profile M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the
machine game with complexity cost c ≥ 0 (NEMc) if ∀i
(i) M∗i is a best response to M
∗
−i;
(ii) There exists no M ′i such that M
′
i is a c-best response to M
∗
−i and ‖M∗i ‖ > ‖M ′i‖.
9Sabourian [20] employs this equilibrium notion.
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By definition, the set of NEMc is a subset of the set of Nash equilibria in the negoti-
ation game. The case of zero complexity cost c = 0 is closest to the standard equilibrium
and corresponds to the case in which complexity enters players’ preferences lexicograph-
ically. Any NEMc with a positive complexity cost c > 0 must also be a NEMc with
c = 0. The magnitude of c therefore can be interpreted as a measure of how much the
players care for less complex strategies, or indeed the players’ bounded rationality.
Abreu and Rubinstein [1], henceforth referred to as AR, propose a general way of
describing a player’s preference ordering over machine profiles that is increasing in his
payoff of the game and decreasing in the complexity of his machine. A Nash equilibrium
can then be written in terms of machines that are most preferred against each other. In
contrast, our equilibrium concept directly finds a subset of Nash equilibria of the under-
lying game that fits our complexity cost criterion (at the margin). There is, however, an
analytical parallel between our choice of solution concept and that of AR because the
latter must also be a Nash equilibrium of the underlying negotiation game (see Appendix
B). Our complexity cost criterion can be thought of as an alternative way to embed the
trade-off between payoff and complexity that underlies AR’s preference ordering.
NEMc strategy profiles are not necessarily credible however. We could introduce
credibility, as in Chatterjee and Sabourian [5][6], by introducing trembles into the model
and considering the limit of extensive form trembling hand equilibrium (Nash equilib-
rium with independent trembles at each information set) with complexity cost as the
trembles become small. The trembles will ensure that strategies are optimal (allowing
for complexity) at every information set that occurs with a positive probability.
A more direct, and simpler, way of introducing credibility would be to consider NEMc
strategy profiles that are subgame-perfect equilibria of the negotiation game without
complexity cost.
Definition 8 A machine profile M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) constitutes a subgame-perfect equilib-
rium of the machine game with complexity cost c ≥ 0 (SPEMc) if M∗ is both a NEMc
and a subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE) of the negotiation game.
Given Proposition 1, we can equivalently define these notions of equilibrium (NEMc
and SPEMc) in terms of underlying strategies and the corresponding measure of com-
plexity comp(·). As mentioned earlier, we prefer the machine game analysis for its ex-
positional economy.
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4 Analysis: Complexity and Efficiency
4.1 NEMc Results
4.1.1 Some Preliminary Results
We begin by laying out some Lemmas that will pave way for the main results below.
These results are derived independently of the magnitudes of complexity cost and dis-
count factor.
We first state an obvious, yet very important, implication of the complexity require-
ment. Suppose that there exists a state in some player’s equilibrium (NEMc) machine
that never appears on the equilibrium path. Unless the machine is minimal, however,
this cannot be possible because this state can be “dropped” by the player to reduce com-
plexity cost without affecting the outcome and payoff, thereby contradicting the NEMc
assumption (that is, there exists another machine identical to the original equilibrium
machine except that it has one less state which, given the other player’s machine, will
generate the same outcome/payoffs). This argument leads to the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Assume that M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc with c ≥ 0. Let M∗i = {M∗ip,M∗ir}
where, for k = p, r, M∗ik = (Q
∗
ik, q
1∗
ik , λ
∗
ik, µ
∗
ik).
10 Then, we have the following:
(i) If T (M∗) ≥ 2, then ∀i, ∀k and ∀qi ∈ Q∗ik there exists a period t such that
qti(M
∗) = qi;
(ii) If T (M∗) ≤ 2, then |Qik| = 1 ∀i and ∀k.
Remark 1 Note that although a player can choose a machine of any size, it follows
from Lemma 1 that for any NEMc profile M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) with c ≥ 0, M∗i (i = 1, 2)
must have a countable number of states.
Next note that, since any strategy can be implemented by a machine, it follows from
its definition that any NEMc profile M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) corresponds to a Nash equilibrium
of the underlying negotiation game; thus (∀c ≥ 0)
pii(M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ) = max
fi∈Fi
pii(fi,M
∗
j ) ∀i, j (1)
where, with some abuse of notation, pii(fi,M
∗
j ) refers to i’s payoff in the game where i
and j play according to fi and M
∗
j respectively.
More generally, the equilibrium machines must be best response (in terms of payoffs)
along the equilibrium path of the negotiation game.
10This will henceforth define the equilibrium machines in our claims.
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Lemma 2 Assume that M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc with c ≥ 0. Then, ∀i, j and ∀τ ≤
T (M∗) we have
piτi (M
∗) = max
fi∈F τi
pii(fi,M
∗
j (q
τ
j ))
where qτj ≡ qτj (M∗), M∗j (qτj ) ∈ Φτj is the machine that is identical to M∗j except that it
starts with the sub-machine which operates in period τ with initial state qτj , and again
with some abuse of notation, pii(fi,M
∗
j (q
τ
j )) refers to i’s payoff in the negotiation game
that starts with role distribution given in period τ and is played by i and j according to
fi ∈ F τi and M∗j (qτj ) respectively.
Proof. See Appendix A. ‖
Now it follows that if a state belonging to a player’s equilibrium machine appears
twice on the outcome path then the continuation payoff of the other player must be
identical at both periods.
Lemma 3 Assume that M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc with c ≥ 0. Then, ∀i, j and ∀t, t′ ≤
T (M∗) we have the following:
if qtj(M
∗) = qt
′
j (M
∗), then piti(M
∗) = pit
′
i (M
∗) .
Proof. This follows from Lemma 2. ‖
Using this information, we can show that if a state belonging to a player’s equilibrium
machine appears on the outcome path for the first time, then the state of the other
player’s machine in that period must also be appearing for the first time. This Lemma
will provide a critical tool behind the derivation of some of the main results below.
Lemma 4 Assume that M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc with c ≥ 0. Then, for any i and
any τ ≤ T (M∗) we have the following:
if qτi (M
∗) 6= qti(M∗) ∀t < τ, then qτj (M∗) 6= qtj(M∗) ∀t < τ .
Proof. Suppose not. So, there exists some i and some τ ≤ T such that qτi 6= qti ∀t < τ
and qτj = q
τ ′
j for some τ
′ < τ . Then, by Lemma 3, piτi = pi
τ ′
i .
Consider player i using another machine M ′i = {M ′ip,M ′ir} where, for k = p, r,
M ′ik = (Q
′
ik, q
1′
ik, λ
′
ik, µ
′
ik). This machine is identical to M
∗
i (as defined before) except
that:
• qτi is dropped
• the transition function is such that µ′ik′(qτ−1i , eτ−1) = qτ ′i where k′ is i’s role in
period τ − 1.
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To be precise, M ′i is such that
• Q′ik = Q∗ik\qτi and Q′il = Q∗il
• q1′ik = q1∗ik and q1′il = q1∗il
• for every k = p, r, every qi ∈ Q′ik and every d ∈ Dik,
λ′ik(qi, d) = λ
∗
ik(qi, d)
• for every k 6= k′, every qi ∈ Q′ik and every e ∈ E,
µ′ik(qi, e) = µ
∗
ik(qi, e)
and for k = k′, every qi ∈ Q′ik and every e ∈ E,
µ′ik(qi, e) =
{
qτ
′
i if qi = q
τ−1
i and e = e
τ−1
µ∗ik(qi, e) otherwise .
Since qτi appears for the first time in period τ on the original equilibrium path, we
cannot have qτ−1i and e
τ−1 appearing together before τ − 1. Thus, playing M ′i against
M∗j does not alter the outcome path up to τ .
But, since qτj = q
τ ′
j and by the definition of M
′
i , it follows that, from τ onwards, the
outcome path between τ ′ and τ − 1 will repeat itself ad infinitum.
Now we show that this does not change i’s payoff from the machine game (given
M∗j ). First, we know that
piτ
′
i (M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ) =
τ−1∑
t=τ ′
δt−τ
′
ui(a
t) + δτ−τ
′
piτi (M
∗
i ,M
∗
j )
=
τ−1∑
t=τ ′
δt−τ
′
ui(a
t) + δτ−τ
′
piτ
′
i (M
∗
i ,M
∗
j )
=
1
1− δτ−τ ′
τ−1∑
t=τ ′
δt−τ
′
ui(a
t) (2)
where the second equality follows from Lemma 3. The new machine also yields the same
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payoff because
piτ
′
i (M
′
i ,M
∗
j ) =
τ−1∑
t=τ ′
δt−τ
′
ui(a
t) + δτ−τ
′
τ−1∑
t=τ ′
δt−τ
′
ui(a
t) + . . .
=
τ−1∑
t=τ ′
δt−τ
′
ui(a
t)(1 + δτ−τ
′
+ δ2(τ−τ
′) + . . .)
=
1
1− δτ−τ ′
τ−1∑
t=τ ′
δt−τ
′
ui(a
t) . (3)
Since (M ′i ,M
∗
j ) and (M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ) induce the same outcome before τ
′, it follows that
pii(M
′
i ,M
∗
j ) = pii(M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ). But then, since q
τ
i is dropped, ‖M∗i ‖ > ‖M ′i‖. Thus, we have
contradiction against NEMc.11 ‖
4.1.2 Agreement
In this sub-section, we shall show that, independently of c and δ, if an agreement occurs
at some finite period as a NEMc outcome, then it must occur within the very first stage
(two periods) of the negotiation game, and thus, the associated equilibrium machines
(strategies) must be minimal (stationary).
To do so, we first establish that if a NEMc induces an agreement in a finite period
beyond the first stage, it must be that the pair of states appearing in the final period
are distinct.
Lemma 5 Assume that M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc with c ≥ 0 and T (M∗) <∞. Then,
qti(M
∗) 6= qTi (M∗) ∀t < T (M∗) and ∀i.
Proof. Suppose not. So, suppose that qti = q
T
i for some i and some t < T . Let
z = (z1, z2) ∈ 42 be the agreement at T . There are two possible cases to consider.
Case A: Player i is the proposer at T .
Define τ = min{t|qti = qTi }. Then, i is the proposer in period τ offering z. By Lemma
3, piτj = pi
T
j . Since there is an agreement on z at T , we have pi
τ
j = zj.
Now consider player j using another machine M ′j = {M ′jp,M ′jr} where, for k = p, r,
M ′jk = (Q
′
jk, q
1′
jk, λ
′
jk, µ
′
jk). This machine is identical to M
∗
j except that:
• qτj is dropped (i.e. Q′jr = Q∗jr\qτj )
11Notice that this result turns on the assumption that each sub-machine uses a distinct set of states.
If the sub-machines shared the states, we could not simply “drop” qτi since it could be used for the
other sub-machine (playing a different role) before τ ′.
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• the transition function is such that µ′jp(qτ−1j , eτ−1) = qTj .
Since, by Lemma 4, qτj (as does q
τ
i by definition) appears for the first time at τ on the
original equilibrium path, this new machine (given M∗i ) generates an identical outcome
path as the original machine M∗j up to τ and then induces the agreement z at τ .
Thus, piτj (M
∗
i ,M
′
j) = zj, and hence, pij(M
∗
i ,M
′
j) = pij(M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ). But since q
τ
j is
dropped, ‖M∗j ‖ > ‖M ′j‖. This contradicts NEMc.
Case B : Player i is the responder at T .
We can show contradiction similarly to Case A above. ‖
We are now ready to present our first major result. For any value of complexity cost,
any NEMc outcome that reaches an agreement must do so in the very first stage of the
negotiation game and hence the associated strategies must be stationary. The intuition
is as follows. The state of each player’s machine occurring in the last period must be
distinct. This implies that, if the last period occurs beyond the first stage of the game,
one of the players must be able to drop it and instead use another state in his (sub-
)machine to condition his behavior in that period without affecting the outcome of the
game. This reduces complexity cost.
Proposition 2 Assume that M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc with c ≥ 0 and T (M∗) <∞.
Then, (i) T (M∗) ≤ 2, and (ii) M∗1 and M∗2 are minimal and hence M∗ is stationary.
Proof. If part (i) of the claim is true, part (ii) must be true because of Lemma 1.
Let us consider part (i).
Suppose not. So, suppose that an agreement z ∈ 42 occurs at some T ∈ (2,∞). We
know from Lemma 5 that qT1 and q
T
2 are both distinct. Now suppose that player i is the
proposer at T and consider two possible cases.
Case A: xτ = z at some τ < T where i proposes.
Consider another machineM ′i = {M ′ip,M ′ir} where, for k = p, r,M ′ik = (Q′ik, q1′ik, λ′ik, µ′ik)
which is identical to M∗i except that:
• qTi is dropped (i.e. Q′ip = Q∗ip\qTi )
• the transition function is such that µ′ir(qT−1i , eT−1) = qτi . (Note that qτi 6= qTi since
we have T > 2 and qTi is distinct by Lemma 5.)
Since λ′ip(q
τ
i , ∅) = z and qTi appears for the first time at T on the original equilibrium
path, this new machine (given M∗j ) generates an identical outcome path and payoff as
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the original machine M∗i . But since q
T
i is dropped, we have ‖M∗i ‖ > ‖M ′i‖. This contra-
dicts NEMc.
Case B : xτ 6= z ∀τ < T where i proposes.
Consider another machineM ′j = {M ′jp,M ′jr} where, for k = p, r,M ′jk = (Q′jk, q1′jk, λ′jk, µ′jk)
which is identical to M∗j except that:
• qTj is dropped (i.e. Q′jr = Q∗jr\qTj )
• the transition function is such that µ′jp(qT−1j , eT−1) = qj 6= qTj for some arbitrary
but fixed qj ∈ Q′jr. (Such qj exists since we have T > 2 and qTj is distinct by
Lemma 5.)
• the output function is such that λ′jr(qj, z) = Y .
Since the offer z does not appear anywhere before T on the original equilibrium path
when i proposes, the new machine (given M∗i ) does not affect the outcome and payoff.
But then, qTj is dropped and therefore we have ‖M∗j ‖ > ‖M ′j‖. This contradicts NEMc. ‖
It immediately follows from Proposition 2 that any NEMc involving an agreement
must be efficient in the limit as the discount factor goes to one.
Corollary 1 For any ² ∈ (0, 1), ∃ δ¯ < 1 such that for any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) and any c ≥ 0,
any NEMc profile M∗ of the negotiation game with discount factor δ that involves an
agreement must be such that
∑
i pii(M
∗) > 1− ².
4.2 SPEMc Results
4.2.1 Stationary Subgame-perfect Equilibria
We begin the SPEMc characterization of the negotiation game by considering stationary
subgame-perfect equilibria. Since our notion of a stationary strategy (Definition 1) allows
for actions conditional on partial history within a period, a stationary SPE here does
not precisely correspond to BW’s characterization (see their Proposition 1 and Corollary
1).
Of course, it must be that for a pair of stationary strategies to constitute a SPE of the
negotiation game, only a Nash equilibrium of the disagreement game can be played after a
rejection (on- or off-the-equilibrium path); otherwise, there will be a profitable deviation
for some player as continuation payoffs are history-independent at the beginning of next
period.
But, a stationary SPE here is not necessarily efficient. Delay in agreement (either
over one period or indefinite) and inefficiency can be sustained in equilibrium because a
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player who makes a deviating offer can be credibly punished in the disagreement game
of the same period if the disagreement game has multiple Nash equilibria.12
The next result provides a characterization of stationary subgame-perfect equilibria.
Proposition 3 Let A∗ be the set of Nash equilibria of G. We have the following:
(i) The negotiation game has a stationary SPE if and only if A∗ is non-empty;
(ii) If f = (f1, f2) is a stationary SPE of the negotiation game, then we have∑
i
pii(f) ≥ 1− (1− δ)b
where b = maxi supa,a′∈A∗ [ui(a)− ui(a′)].13
Proof. (i) Necessity follows from the property that in any stationary SPE the players
must play a Nash equilibrium of G after any rejection. Sufficiency follows from Corollary
1 of BW.
(ii) Suppose not. So, suppose that f = (f1, f2) is a stationary SPE of the negotiation
game and ∑
i
pii(f) + ² < 1− (1− δ)b (6)
for some ² > 0. Since this equilibrium is inefficient, agreement cannot happen in the first
period.
12For instance, suppose that G has three Nash equilibria a = (a1, a2), a1 = (a11, a
1
2) and a
2 = (a21, a
2
2)
such that
1 >
∑
i
ui(a) ≥ 1− (1− δ)max
i
(ui(ai)− ui(a)) (4)
and
ui(ai) > ui(a) ∀i . (5)
Then, there exists a stationary SPE in which the players disagree indefinitely and play a in every
period after rejection. We can easily check that given (4) and (5) the following stationary strategy
profile f = (f1, f2) constitutes a SPE. For each i, fi is such that ∀h ∈ H∞ip
fi(h, ∅) = xi = (xi1, xi2) ∈ 42 such that xij < uj(a)
fi(h, x,N) =
{
ai if x = xi
aji if x 6= xi
and ∀h ∈ H∞ir
fi(h, x) = Y if and only if xi > (1− δ)ui(ai) + δui(a)
fi(h, x,N) =
{
ai if x = xj
aii if x 6= xj .
13Notice that b ∈ [0, 1].
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But then, consider player 1 making a deviating offer in t = 1, z = (z1, z2) ∈ 42 such
that
z2 = (1− δ)(u2(a1) + b) + δpi22(f) + ²
where a1 is the disagreement game equilibrium outcome in t = 1 when f is chosen.
Clearly, given subgame-perfectness of the stationary profile f and the definition of b (as
in the claim), f2 will accept such offer.
We thus want such deviation to be unprofitable for player 1; that is, we want z1 ≤
pi1(f), or
1− (1− δ)(u2(a1) + b)− δpi22(f)− ² ≤ (1− δ)u1(a1) + δpi21(f) .
This implies that ∑
i
pii(f) + ² ≥ 1− (1− δ)b .
But this contradicts (6). ‖
It immediately follows from Proposition 3 that for a sufficiently large discount factor
every stationary SPE must be (almost) efficient.
Corollary 2 For any ² ∈ (0, 1), ∃ δ¯ < 1 such that, for any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), we have the
following: If f is a stationary SPE of the negotiation game with discount factor δ, then∑
i pii(f) > 1− ².
We can also deduce that in some cases a stationary SPE is efficient independently of
the discount factor.
Corollary 3 For any δ, every stationary SPE of the negotiation game is efficient if
either (i) G has a unique Nash equilibrium; or (ii) ∀a ∈ A∗ we have ∑i ui(a) < 1 − b
(where b is as defined in Proposition 3).
Proof. (i) If G has a unique Nash equilibrium, b = 0. Thus, the claim follows from
Proposition 3.
(ii) Let f be a stationary SPE of the negotiation and assume that it is inefficient.
There are two possible cases to consider.
Case A: There is one period of delay, followed by an agreement.
We know from Proposition 3 that
∑
i pii(f) ≥ 1− (1− δ)b. Thus, it must be that
(1− δ)
∑
i
ui(a) + δ ≥ 1− (1− δ)b
where a ∈ A∗ is the disagreement game outcome in the first period. But this is clearly
not possible if ∀a ∈ A∗ ∑i ui(a) < 1− b as in the claim.
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Case B : There is infinite delay.
Let a1 ∈ A∗ and a2 ∈ A∗ be the disagreement outcome in odd and even periods
respectively. Then, by Proposition 3, we must have∑
i ui(a
1) + δ
∑
i ui(a
2)
1 + δ
≥ 1− (1− δ)b .
Again, this is not possible if
∑
i ui(a) < 1− b, ∀a ∈ A∗. ‖
4.2.2 SPEMc and Perpetual Disagreement
We now consider SPEMc outcomes in which agreement never occurs. Some of the results
here are sensitive to whether the complexity cost c is zero (lexicographic preferences),
or positive.
We shall denote by Ωδ(c) the set of SPEMc profiles in the negotiation game with
common discount factor δ when complexity cost is c.
First, we show that, given any complexity cost and a discount factor arbitrarily close
to one, any SPEMc outcome with perpetual disagreement must be at least long-run
(almost) efficient; that is, the players must eventually reach a finite period at which the
sum of their continuation payoffs is approximately equal to one.
The argument behind this statement turns critically on the fact that every state of
each player’s equilibrium machine must appear on the equilibrium path (Lemma 1). This
implies the following. Suppose that a player deviates from a SPEMc of the negotiation
game by making a different offer in some period. What can the other player obtain if
he rejects this offer? Since the state of each player’s (sub-)machine is fixed for each
period (not at each decision node), the ensuing disagreement game of the period may
see an outcome that never happens on the original equilibrium path; but then, Lemma
1 implies that the subsequent transition must take the players to some point along the
original path for next period. Thus, any punishment for a player who deviates from the
proposed equilibrium must itself occur on the equilibrium path (except for the play of
the disagreement game immediately after the deviating offer), and as a consequence, the
set of equilibrium outcomes is severely restricted.
Informally, we consider the period in which a player gets his maximum continuation
payoff in the proposer role. Bargaining can then be used by the other player in the
preceding period to break up the on-going disagreement if there is any (continuation)
inefficiency from then on. In such cases, there exists a Pareto-improving deviation offer
because the responder in that period, who will be proposing next, cannot obtain more
from punishing the deviant than what he is already getting from the original outcome
as of next period. We need the discount factor to be sufficiently large so as to eliminate
the importance of the current period in which the deviation is followed immediately by
an off-the-equilibrium play of the disagreement game.
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Proposition 4 For any ² ∈ (0, 1), ∃ δ¯ < 1 such that, for any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), any c ≥ 0, and
any M∗ ∈ Ωδ(c) with T (M∗) =∞, ∃ τ <∞ such that ∑i piτi (M∗) > 1− ².
Proof : Fix any ² ∈ (0, 1). Define
β = max
{
1,max
i
sup
a,a′∈A
[ui(a)− ui(a′)]
}
(7)
which is bounded since u(·) is. Define also
δ¯ = 1− ²
β
.
Given these, consider any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) (thus ² > β(1 − δ)), any c ≥ 0 and any M∗ =
(M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) ∈ Ωδ(c) with T (M∗) =∞.
Define η, tik and τη such that
0 < η < ²− β(1− δ), (8)
tik = {t| i plays role k}, (9)
and
τη = min{t ∈ t2p | pit2 + η > pit
′
2 ∀t′ ∈ t2p} (10)
where pit2 is player 2’s continuation payoff at period t if M
∗ is chosen. Clearly, τη <∞.
Now, given M∗1 , consider player 2’s continuation payoff after rejecting any offer in
any period belonging to t2r. Notice that since
• every state of M∗1 appears on the equilibrium path of M∗ (Lemma 1)
• pit2 = maxf2∈F t2 (f2,M∗1 (qt1)) ∀t (Lemma 2),
player 2’s continuation payoff at the next period if he rejects any offer (given M∗1 ) is at
most supt∈t2p pi
t
2. We also have pi
τη
2 + η > pi
t
2 ∀t ∈ t2p.
The above implies that if player 2’s equilibrium machine M∗2 receives an offer
z′ = (1− pimax2r , pimax2r ) ∈ 42
where
pimax2r = (1− δ) sup
a∈A
u2(a) + δ
(
pi
τη
2 + η
)
, (11)
it must always accept because of the subgame-perfectness of the profile M∗.
Now, consider player 1 using another machine M ′1 = {M ′1p,M ′1r} where, for k = p, r,
M ′1k = (Q
′
1k, q
1′
1k, λ
′
1k, µ
′
1k). This machine is identical toM
∗
1 except for the output function
which is such that
λ′1p(q
τη−1
1 , ∅) = z′ . (12)
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Define
τ = min
t
{t| qt1 = qτη−11 } . (13)
Since M∗2 always accepts the offer z
′ and M ′1 differs from M
∗
1 only in offers conditional
on state q
τη−1
1 , it follows that (M
′
1,M
∗
2 ) results in agreement z
′ in period τ .
We also know by Lemma 3 that piτ2 = pi
τη−1
2 . Thus, we have
piτ2 = (1− δ)u2(aτη−1) + δpiτη2 . (14)
Now, since supa∈A u2(a)− u2(aτη−1) ≤ β (where β is given by (7)), we have, by (11)
and (14),
pimax2r − piτ2 ≤ (1− δ)β + δη .
Using this, we can write
1− pimax2r ≥ 1− (piτ2 + (1− δ)β + δη) . (15)
Since M∗ is a SPEMc it must be that piτ1 ≥ 1− pimax2r ; otherwise the deviation to M ′1
is profitable. This implies that (given δ < 1)
piτ1 + pi
τ
2 > 1− ((1− δ) β + η) .
But, since by (8) we have ² > (1− δ) β + η, it follows that at period τ < ∞,∑
i pi
τ
i > 1− ² as in the claim. ‖
Proposition 4 does not however rule out the possibility that we observe inefficiency (in
terms of continuation payoffs) early on in the negotiation game.14 Given any ² > 0 and
δ sufficiently close to one, we can write the total equilibrium payoff from the negotiation
game as ∑
i
pii(M
∗) > (1− δ)
τ−1∑
t=1
δt−1ut + δτ−1(1− ²) (16)
where M∗ is the equilibrium machine profile (with T (M∗) = ∞), ut =∑i ui (at (M∗)),
and τ is the period in which continuation (first) becomes (almost) efficient. The limit of
the right-hand side as ² → 0 and δ → 1 is not necessarily the efficient level (because τ
may depend on δ).15
14To be precise, neither does it rule out the possibility that there will be inefficient disagreement
game outcomes even after τ . It is just that the continuation game from then on is almost efficient.
15If we restrict each player’s machine to use only a finite number of states, then any machine profile
must generate cycles. But this is not enough to guarantee that Proposition 4 implies ex ante efficiency
in the limit as δ goes to one. For this, we need for instance to additionally assume that the size of a
machine is uniformly bounded (for any δ) so that the first cycle cannot last beyond a fixed period.
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In fact, when complexity cost c is strictly positive, it turns out that any SPEMc of
the negotiation game must be stationary (minimal) however small that complexity cost
is.
Proposition 5 For any c > 0, ∃ δ¯ < 1 such that, for any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), every M∗ ∈ Ωδ(c)
is stationary.
Proof. We shall prove the claim by way of contradiction.
Fix any c ∈ (0, 1).16 Define δ¯ = 1− c
β
where β is given by (7) above.
Given these, consider any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), and any M∗ = (M∗1 ,M∗2 ) ∈ Ωδ(c) that is not
stationary.
Then, both equilibrium machines M∗1 and M
∗
2 are non-minimal. (Trivially, if one was
minimal, then by part (i) of Lemma 10 in Appendix B the other must also be minimal.)
Also, by Proposition 2, it must be that T (M∗) =∞.
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 4 above, define η such that
0 < η < c− β(1− δ) . (17)
Define as before tik, τη, and τ (see (9), (10), and (13)).
We need to consider the following two cases separately.
Case A: τη > 2
First note that
qt1 6= qτη1 ∀t < τη . (18)
Otherwise qt1 = q
τη
1 for some t < τη. But then, we have pi
t
2 = pi
τη
2 by Lemma 3. This
contradicts the definition of τη.
Next, consider player 1 using another machine M ′1 = {M ′1p,M ′1r} where, for k = p, r,
M ′1k = (Q
′
1k, q
1′
1k, λ
′
1k, µ
′
1k). This machine is identical to M
∗
1 except that:
• (similarly to (12) above)
λ′1p(q
τη−1
1 , ∅) = (1− pimax2r , pimax2r ) = z′
where pimax2r is defined by (11) with η now given by (17);
• qτη1 is dropped (i.e. Q′1r = Q∗1r\qτη1 ).
16The case of c ≥ 1 is trivial because then complexity cost (weakly) dominates any feasible average
payoff for each player in the negotiation game and thus any equilibrium machine must be minimal. We
can refer to BW Result 1 for SPEMc characterization in this case.
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By (18), dropping q
τη
1 does not affect the outcome path up to τ . Therefore, by similar
arguments as in the proof of Proposition 4, the deviation would induce agreement z′ in
period τ .
It follows that player 1’s deviation payoff here is given also by 1 − pimax2r , and as in
(15), we have
1− pimax2r ≥ 1− (piτ2 + (1− δ)β + δη) .
We also have that 1− piτ2 ≥ piτ1 . Thus, player 1’s loss from such deviation is
piτ1 − (1− pimax2r ) ≤ (1− δ)β + δη . (19)
But the new machine M ′1 has one less state than M
∗
1 (since q
τη
1 has been dropped)
which means that the deviation also results in a saving on complexity cost by c > 0.
Since c > (1− δ)β + η by (17), we have
piτ1 − (1− pimax2r ) < c
implying that the deviation is in fact profitable. (More precisely, this implies that M∗1 is
not a c-best response to M∗2 .)
This contradicts the proposed SPEMc. Therefore, T (M∗) < ∞, and by Proposition
2, M∗ must be minimal, and hence, stationary.
Case B : τη = 2
We know that M∗1 is not minimal. Then, consider player 1 using another minimal
machine M ′1 = {M ′1p,M ′1r} where, for k = p, r, M ′1k = (Q′1k, q1′1k, λ′1k, µ′1k). This machine
is constructed such that:
• Q′1p = {q11} and Q′1r = {q21}
• λ′1p(q11, ∅) = z′ (where z′ is as appearing in Case A above).
By similar arguments to those behind Case A above, such deviation induces imme-
diate agreement on z′ and is (overall) profitable for player 1 since the new machine is
minimal and has less states than the original machine. Thus we again have contradiction
against SPEMc. The claim then follows as before. ‖
4.2.3 Summary
Let us summarize our SPEMc results, and in particular, highlight the efficiency property
of an equilibrium in the machine game. Putting together Proposition 2, Proposition 4
and Corollary 1, we first characterize the set of all SPEMc in the negotiation game
when the players’ preferences are lexicographic (c = 0). Provided that the players are
sufficiently patient, (i) every SPEM0 inducing an agreement must do so in the very first
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stage of the negotiation game, and thus, be stationary and (almost) efficient; and (ii)
every SPEM0 inducing perpetual disagreement must be at least (almost) efficient in the
long run.
Theorem 1 (Lexicographic Preferences) For any ² ∈ (0, 1), ∃ δ¯ < 1 such that for
any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) we have the following:
(i) If M∗ is a NEM0 (and therefore SPEM0) with T (M∗) < ∞, then T (M∗) ≤ 2,
M∗ is stationary and ∑
i
pii(M
∗) > 1− ² ;
(ii) If M∗ is a SPEM0 with T (M∗) =∞, then ∃ τ <∞ such that∑
i
piτi (M
∗) > 1− ² .
If we assume positive complexity cost, the predictions are sharper. Only stationary,
and hence, (almost) efficient equilibria are possible under sufficiently patient players.
Theorem 2 puts together Proposition 5 and Corollary 2.
Theorem 2 (When Complexity Cost is Positive) For any c > 0 and any ² ∈
(0, 1), ∃ δ¯ < 1 such that, for any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1), every M∗ ∈ Ωδ(c) is stationary and such
that ∑
i
pii(M
∗) > 1− ² .
We can also deduce from Proposition 4 that if the structure of the disagreement game
is such that there exists no action profile delivering the efficient surplus (and also the
players are sufficiently patient), the players cannot disagree forever for any non-negative
complexity cost. Thus, in this case every SPEMc must, induce an agreement in the first
stage, be stationary, and be efficient in the limit.
Theorem 3 (When Agreement Dominates Disagreement) Suppose that we have∑
i ui(a) < 1 ∀a ∈ A. Then, ∃ δ¯ ∈ (0, 1) such that, for any δ ∈ (δ¯, 1) and any c ≥ 0,
every M∗ ∈ Ωδ(c) is such that T (M∗) ≤ 2, and hence, is stationary and efficient in the
limit as δ goes to one.
We can further relate the set of SPEMc in the negotiation game to the structure of the
disagreement game G. For instance, Corollary 3 reports some cases where a stationary
SPE of the negotiation game is efficient independently of the discount factor. In those
cases, we have a stronger set of efficiency results.
Remark 2 Suppose either G has a unique Nash equilibrium, or ∀a ∈ A∗ we have∑
i ui(a) < 1 − b (where b is as defined in Proposition 3). Then, provided that the
players are sufficiently patient, for any c > 0 every SPEMc is efficient (not just in the
limit) as is every SPEM0 involving an agreement.
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5 An Alternative Machine Specification
Since each stage game of the negotiation game has a sequential structure, we can have
alternative machine specifications that employ more frequent transitions and hence ac-
count for finer partitions of histories and continuation strategies. Let us present a ma-
chine which consists of four sub-machines.
The machine under Definition 9 below maintains the role distinction and employs
distinct sub-machines to play the bargaining and the disagreement game within each
period. Transition thus takes place twice within each period - once after the bargaining
and once after the disagreement game.17
Definition 9 (Four sub-machine (4SM) specification) A machine,
Mi = {Mip, M˜ip,Mir, M˜ir}, consists of four sub-machines Mik = (Qik, q1ik, λik, µik) and
M˜ik = (Q˜ik, q˜
1
ik, λ˜ik, µ˜ik) for k = p, r. Each sub-machine consists of a set of states,
an initial state, an output function and a transition function such that ∀qik ∈ Qik,
∀q˜ik ∈ Q˜ik, ∀xi, xj ∈ 42 and ∀a ∈ A,
λip(qip, ∅) ∈ 42;
λ˜ip(q˜ip, ∅) ∈ Ai;
λir(qir, x
j) ∈ {Y,N};
λ˜ir(q˜ir, ∅) ∈ Ai;
and
µip(qip, x
i, N) ∈ Q˜ip;
µ˜ip(q˜ip, a) ∈ Qir;
µir(qir, x
j, N) ∈ Q˜ir;
µ˜ir(q˜ir, a) ∈ Qip .
As a notational convention, we shall use Mik to denote the sub-machine that plays
the bargaining part of the negotiation game to distinguish it from M˜ik, the sub-machine
that plays the disagreement game. The components of each sub-machine are denoted
with similar conventions. Also, whenever it is necessary to distinguish the new definition
from the previously used definition with two sub-machines, we shall refer to them by
4SM and 2SM respectively.
17We can also construct a machine in which transition occurs at each decision node of the stage game.
Six sub-machines will then be required (some of which will in fact serve only to make transition and not
output). There are several other ways to divide each stage. But we conjecture that as long as we keep
the role distinction for the bargaining part the central results will remain irrespective of the machine
specification.
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As before H tik(= H
t
jl) refers to the set of t-period histories. Here, we also denote the
set of all possible histories at a disagreement game of period t in which i plays role k
as H˜ tik = H
t
ik × {(x,N) | ∀x ∈ 42}. Also, define H˜∞ik = ∪∞t=1H˜ tik. We continue to denote
by Fi and Φi the set of player i’s strategies and machines in the negotiation (machine)
game respectively.
A minimal machine in the 4SM specification is again a machine whose sub-machines
have only one state each, but it corresponds to an alternative notion of stationarity.18
Definition 10 A strategy fi is Markov-stationary if and only if
fi(h) = fi(h
′) ∀h, h′ ∈ H∞ip and ∀h, h′ ∈ H˜∞ik (k = p, r);
fi(h, x
j) = fi(h
′, xj) ∀h, h′ ∈ H∞ir ,∀xj ∈ 42 .
Notice that according to this definition of a stationary strategy the disagreement
game actions are independent of partial history within a period. Therefore, this defini-
tion captures Markov behavior. Moreover, this definition corresponds precisely to BW’s
notion of stationarity and thus we can appeal to their characterization of stationary
subgame-perfect equilibria. Especially, the efficiency of a Markov-stationary SPE does
not depend on the discount factor. The following is implied by Proposition 1 and Corol-
lary 1 of BW.
Remark 3 Let A∗ be the set of Nash equilibria of G. We have the following:
(i) The negotiation game has a Markov-stationary SPE if and only if A∗ is non-
empty;
(ii) If f = (f1, f2) is a Markov-stationary SPE of the negotiation game, then it is
efficient; that is
∑
i pii(f) = 1;
(iii) Suppose that
∑
i ui(a) < 1 ∀a ∈ A∗. Then, if f is a Markov-stationary SPE of
the negotiation game, it induces an immediate agreement.
There may be a Markov-stationary SPE in the negotiation game in which delay takes
place, but then, since this equilibrium must be efficient, the disagreement game action
profiles (Nash equilibria of G) appearing on the equilibrium path must be efficient.
We define NEMc and SPEMc exactly as before except that the complexity of a
machine (4SM) is now given by ‖Mi‖ =
∑
k |Qik|+
∑
k |Q˜ik|. We also need to re-define
the corresponding definition of complexity in terms of strategies. Let Fik(fi) = {fi|h :
h ∈ H∞ik } be as before and introduce F˜ik(fi) = {fi|h : h ∈ H˜∞ik } to indicate the set
of continuation strategies at a disagreement game of period t when i plays role k. It is
18We shall henceforth refer to a minimal 4SM (profile) interchangeably as a Markov-stationary ma-
chine (profile).
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straightforward to extend Proposition 1 to show that, for any fi ∈ Fi,
∑
k |Fik(fi)| +∑
k |F˜ik(fi)| corresponds to the size of a smallest 4SM implementing fi.
Given this foundation, analyzing the machine game in the 4SM specification is anal-
ogous to the previous 2SM case (though a little more cumbersome expositionally). Note
here that while the game is being played bargaining alone does not generate any payoffs.
Thus, piti(·) equally represents i’s continuation payoff at every subgame within the period
(on the equilibrium path).
We introduce some further notational changes. Let F ti and Φ
t
i respectively denote
the set of player i’s strategies and machines in the negotiation (machine) game starting
at the beginning of a period in which the roles are given as in period t. Thus, if t is
odd, F ti = Fi and Φ
t
i = Φi. Also, let F˜
t
i and Φ˜
t
i respectively denote the set of player i’s
strategies and machines in the negotiation (machine) game starting at the beginning of
the disagreement game of a period in which the roles are given as in period t.
First, it is clear that any NEMc profile in 4SM must be by definition a Nash equilib-
rium of the underlying negotiation game. It is also true under this alternative machine
specification that every state belonging to a (non-minimal) equilibrium machine must
appear on the equilibrium path and if the game ends in the first stage the associated
equilibrium machines must be minimal (Lemma 1). The following three Lemmas corre-
spond to Lemmas 2, 3, and 4 respectively. (We omit some of the proofs.)
Lemma 6 Assume thatM∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc in the 4SM specification with c ≥ 0.
Then, ∀i, j we have:
(i) piτi (M
∗) = max
fi∈F τi
pii(fi,M
∗
j (q
τ
j )) ∀τ ≤ T (M∗)
(ii) piτi (M
∗) = max
fi∈F˜ τi
pii(fi,M
∗
j (q˜
τ
j )) ∀τ < T (M∗)
where M∗j (q
τ
j ) ∈ Φτi (M∗j (q˜τj ) ∈ Φ˜τi ) is the machine identical to M∗j except that it starts
with the sub-machine operating in the bargaining (disagreement game) part of period τ
with initial state qτj (q˜
τ
j ), and with some abuse of notation, pii(fi,M
∗
j (q
τ
j )) (pii(fi,M
∗
j (q˜
τ
j )))
refers to i’s payoff in the negotiation game that starts with role distribution given in
period τ and is played by i and j according to fi ∈ F τi (fi ∈ F˜ τi ) and M∗j (qτj ) (M∗j (q˜τj ))
respectively.
Lemma 7 Assume thatM∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc in the 4SM specification with c ≥ 0.
Then, ∀i, j and ∀t, t′ ≤ T (M∗), we have the following:
if qtj = q
t′
j or q˜
t
j = q˜
t′
j , then pi
t
i(M
∗) = pit
′
i (M
∗) .
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Lemma 8 Assume thatM∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc in the 4SM specification with c ≥ 0.
Then, for any i and any τ ≤ T (M∗), we have the following:
(i) if qτi (M
∗) 6= qti(M∗) ∀t < τ, then qτj (M∗) 6= qtj(M∗) ∀t < τ
(ii) if q˜τi (M
∗) 6= q˜ti(M∗) ∀t < τ, then q˜τj (M∗) 6= q˜tj(M∗) ∀t < τ .
Proof. See Appendix A. ‖
Using these Lemmas, it is straightforward to extend the agreement results in Section
4.1.2 to the 4SM case. If a NEMc outcome under this alternative specification ends at
some finite period, the pair of states occurring in the last period must be distinct. (Notice
that the sub-machines used for playing the disagreement game will not be operating in
the final period.)
Lemma 9 Assume that M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc in the 4SM specification with c ≥ 0
and T (M∗) <∞. Then, qti 6= qTi ∀t < T and ∀i.
Proof. See Appendix A. ‖
Again, this implies that the agreement must occur within the first stage of the game;
otherwise the states in the final period can be “replaced” thereby yielding a saving on
complexity cost. (We shall omit the proof of the following result. It is almost identical
to that of Proposition 2 and Corollary 1.)
Proposition 6 If M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEMc in the 4SM specification with c ≥ 0
and T (M∗) < ∞, then (i) T (M∗) ≤ 2, (ii) M∗1 and M∗2 are minimal and hence M∗ is
Markov-stationary; and (iii) M∗ is efficient in the limit as δ goes to one.
What we gain from using this alternative machine specification is in the case of
SPEMc. Specifically, the SPEMc results in Section 4.2.2 no longer depend on the discount
factor. In particular, we derive the following results (corresponding to Propositions 4 and
5). Let Ω˜δ(c) denote the set of SPEMc in 4SM given discount factor δ and complexity
cost c.
Proposition 7 Fix any c ≥ 0 and any δ ∈ (0, 1), and consider any M∗ ∈ Ω˜δ(c) with
T (M∗) =∞. Then for any ² > 0, ∃ τ <∞ such that ∑i piτi (M∗) > 1− ².
Proof . Fix any ². Also, fix any c ≥ 0 and any δ ∈ (0, 1), and consider any M∗ =
(M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) ∈ Ω˜δ(c) with T (M∗) =∞.
Let M∗i = {M∗ip, M˜∗ip,M∗ir, M˜∗ir} where, for k = p, r, M∗ik = (Q∗ik, q1∗ik , λ∗ik, µ∗ik) and
M˜∗ik = (Q˜ik, q˜
1∗
ik , λ˜
∗
ik, µ˜
∗
ik).
19
19This will henceforth define the equilibrium machines in our claims in this section.
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Define η such that 0 < η < ². Define also tik as before (see (9)) and
τ = min{t ∈ tir | piti + η > pit
′
i ∀t′ ∈ tir} . (20)
Since
• every state of M∗j appears on the equilibrium path of M∗
• transition also occurs at the end of bargaining within each period
• piti = maxfi∈F˜ τi pii(fi,M∗j (q˜tj)) ∀t (Lemma 6),
(given M∗j ) the maximum continuation payoff player i can obtain if he rejects any offer
at any t ∈ tir is equal to supt∈tir pit which is less than piτi + η. Then, given the subgame-
perfectness of the profile M∗, i’s equilibrium machine M∗i must accept if j offers
z′′ = (z′′i , z
′′
j ) = (pi
τ
i + η, 1− piτi − η) ∈ 42 (21)
at any t ∈ tir.
Consider now player j using another machine M ′j = {M ′jp, M˜ ′jp,M ′jr, M˜ ′jr} where,
for p = k, r, M ′jk = (Q
′
jk, q
1′
jk, λ
′
jk, µ
′
jk) and M˜
′
jk = (Q˜
′
jk, q˜
1′
jk, λ˜
′
jk, µ˜
′
jk). This machine is
identical to M∗j except for the output function which is such that
λ′jp(q
τ
j , ∅) = z′′ . (22)
Now, note that qτj 6= qtj ∀t < τ . Otherwise, piti = piτi by Lemma 7, which contradicts
the definition of τ . Thus, (by similar arguments to those in the proof of Proposition 4
above) (M∗i ,M
′
j) would induce agreement z
′′ in period τ .
SinceM∗ is a SPEMc, it must be that piτj ≥ 1−piτi −η, implying that piτi +piτj ≥ 1−η.
But we fixed η < ², and thus, at τ <∞ we have ∑i piτi > 1− ² as in the claim. ‖
Proposition 8 For any c > 0 and any δ ∈ (0, 1), every M∗ ∈ Ω˜δ(c) is Markov-
stationary.
Proof. Suppose not. Then there exists some c > 0, some δ ∈ (0, 1) and a machine
profile M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) ∈ Ω˜δ(c) that is not minimal (Markov-stationary).
Then, we know that M∗1 and M
∗
2 are both non-minimal (appealing to Lemma 10 in
Appendix B). Also, by Proposition 6, T (M∗) =∞.
Define η such that 0 < η < c. Define also tik as in (9) and τ as in (20).
Case A: τ > 2
Consider now player j using another machine M ′j = {M ′jp, M˜ ′jp,M ′jr, M˜ ′jr} where, for
p = k, r, M ′jk = (Q
′
jk, q
1′
jk, λ
′
jk, µ
′
jk) and M˜
′
jk = (Q˜
′
jk, q˜
1′
jk, λ˜
′
jk, µ˜
′
jk).
This machine is identical to M∗j except that:
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• (similarly to (22) above)
λ′jp(q
τ
j , ∅) = z′′
where z′′ is defined by (21) with η now being such that 0 < η < c;
• q˜τj is dropped (i.e. Q˜′jp = Q˜∗jp\q˜τj ).
First note that we have qτj 6= qtj and q˜τj 6= q˜tj ∀t < τ . Otherwise, piti = piτi by Lemma
7, which contradicts the definition of τ . Thus, dropping q˜τj would not affect the outcome
up to τ .
By similar arguments as in the previous Proposition, (M∗i ,M
′
j) would induce agree-
ment z′′ in period τ . Dropping q˜τj is immaterial to this outcome because agreement takes
place before the players reach the disagreement game in the period.
Since piτi ≤ 1−piτj , j’s loss from such deviation is η. But the new machineM ′j has one
less state thanM∗j and thus there is also a saving in complexity cost by c. We fixed η < c
and thus the deviation is profitable. This contradicts the proposed SPEMc; therefore,
T (M∗) <∞. The claim then follows from Proposition 6.
Case B : τ ≤ 2
We can derive contradiction for this case using similar arguments appearing in Case
B of the proof of Proposition 5. ‖
We can finally summarize the SPEMc results under the 4SM specification, using
Remark 3.
Theorem 4 For any δ, we have:
(i) If M∗ ∈ Ω˜δ(0) is such that T (M∗) < ∞, then T (M∗) ≤ 2, M∗ is Markov-
stationary and hence ∑
i
pii(M
∗) = 1 ;
(ii) If M∗ ∈ Ω˜δ(0) is such that T (M∗) =∞, then for any ² > 0 ∃ τ <∞ such that∑
i
piτi (M
∗) > 1− ² .
Theorem 5 For any c > 0 and any δ, every M∗ ∈ Ω˜δ(c) is Markov-stationary and
hence is efficient.
Theorem 6 Suppose that
∑
i ui(a) < 1 ∀a ∈ A. Then, for any c ≥ 0 and any δ,
every M∗ ∈ Ω˜δ(c) induces an immediate agreement, and hence, is Markov-stationary
and efficient.
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6 Conclusion
When players care for complexity of a strategy as well as payoffs, the negotiation game
can only display equilibria that are efficient. Thus, complexity and bargaining together
offer an explanation for co-operation in two-person repeated interactions.
Independently of complexity cost, discount factor and the choice of machine speci-
fication, the negotiation game cannot have a NEMc in which an agreement takes place
after delay beyond the first stage. If an agreement were to be part of an equilibrium out-
come, then it must be so in the very first stage of the game, and the associated strategy
profile must be stationary.
The precise efficiency results with perfection, however, depend on whether complex-
ity cost is zero (lexicographic preferences) or is positive, and also, on the chosen ma-
chine/complexity specification.
Under the 2SM specification, we find the following set of SPEMc results under suf-
ficiently patient players. If complexity cost is strictly positive, any SPEMc of the ne-
gotiation game must be stationary, and hence, (almost) efficient however small that
complexity cost is. If complexity cost is zero, in addition to stationary equilibria the
negotiation game can also admit a non-stationary equilibrium (SPEM0) in which dis-
agreement persists indefinitely. But this case still has to be (almost) efficient in the
long run. It then follows that, regardless of complexity cost, every SPEMc must induce
an agreement in the first stage of the negotiation game in cases where disagreement is
strictly dominated by agreement.
If we adopt the 4SM specification (thereby accounting for finer partitions of histories
and continuation strategies in representing strategic complexity) essentially the same set
of insights are derived, but independently of the discount factor.
There are several channels to further generalize the analysis in this paper. Especially,
we can reinforce the repeated game flavor of the negotiation game by considering a
broader set of payoffs that can be associated with bargaining and agreement. We can,
for instance, let the space of offers be some arbitrary (but ‘well-behaved’) set P ⊂ R2
such that u(a) ⊆ P for all a ∈ A, thereby allowing an offer to include any disagreement
game payoff vector. We conjecture that complexity will still select the efficient outcomes
in this case.
7 Appendix A: Relegated Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let Mi = {Mip,Mir} be any machine that implements some
strategy fi where Mik = (Qik, q
1
ik, λik, µik) for k = p, r.
First, we show that |Qik| ≥ |Fik(fi)| ∀k.
For any qi ∈ Qik and k = p, r, let Mi(qi) = {Mik(qi),Mil} be the machine that
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is identical to Mi except that it starts with the sub-machine Mik(qi) where Mik(qi) =
(Qik, qi, λik, µik) is the sub-machine identical to Mik except for the initial state qi.
Note that for every f¯i ∈ Fik(fi) and k = p, r, there exists some h ∈ H∞ik such that
f¯i = fi|h. Now define a function Γik : Qik → Fik(fi) such that Γik(q¯i) is the strategy
implemented by Mi(q¯i) for any q¯i ∈ Qik. It then follows that for every f¯i ∈ Fik(fi), there
must exist a distinct state q¯i ∈ Qik such that Γik(q¯i) = f¯i. Simply let q¯i = qi(h) (as
defined inductively in Section 3) where h is the history such that f¯i = fi|h.20
Second, we show that there exists a machine implementation of fi which only uses
Fip(fi) and Fir(fi) as the set of states for its corresponding sub-machines.
Define M¯i = {M¯ip, M¯ir} such that, for k = p, r, M¯ik = (Fik(fi), f 1ik, λ¯ik, µ¯ik) where
• f 1ik ∈ Fik(fi) is the initial state and if i plays role k at the initial history then
f 1ik = fi;
• for any f¯i ∈ Fik(fi) and d ∈ Dik, λ¯ik(f¯i, d) = f¯i(∅, d) where ∅ is the empty history;
• µ¯ik(f¯i, e) = f¯i|h, e for any h ∈ H∞ik and e ∈ E.
This machine has
∑
k |Fik(fi)| states (each k sub-machine with |Fik(fi)| states) and im-
plements fi. ‖
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose not. Then, for some i and τ ≤ T (M∗), there exists
another machine M¯i = {M¯ip, M¯ir} ∈ Φτi such that
piτi (M
∗) < pii(M¯i,M∗j (q
τ
j )) .
Now, consider player i using at the outset another machine M ′i = {M ′ip,M ′ir} where,
for k = p, r, M ′ik = (Q
′
ik, q
1′
ik, λ
′
ik, µ
′
ik). This machine is constructed in the following way.
Let qti ∈ Q∗ik denote the state of M∗i appearing in period t (where i is in role k) when
M∗ is chosen. Also let et be the outcome in period t when M∗ is chosen.
For every t < τ and k = p, r, there exists a distinct state q′i(t) ∈ Q′ik such that
λ′ik(q
′
i(t), d) = λ
∗
ik(q
t
i , d) for all d ∈ Dik .
The transition function of the new machine is such that
µ′ik(q
′
i(t), e
t) =
{
q′i(t+ 1) ∀t < τ − 1
q¯ for t = τ − 1
where q¯ ∈ Q′ik is another distinct state such that M ′i(q¯) = M¯i.
20It is critical here that each sub-machine uses its own distinct set of states. Otherwise, a single state
can be used to activate two distinct continuation strategies, one in each role.
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Thus, M ′i played against M
∗
j replicates the outcome path up to τ such that
τ−1∑
t=1
δt−1ui
(
at(M ′i ,M
∗
j )
)
=
τ−1∑
t=1
δt−1ui
(
at(M∗i ,M
∗
j )
)
followed by activation of M¯i at τ . It then follows that pii(M
′
i ,M
∗
j ) > pii(M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ). But
this contradicts (1) above. ‖
Proof of Lemma 8. (i) Suppose not. So, there exists some τ ≤ T such that qτi 6= qti
∀t < τ and qτj = qτ ′j for some τ ′ < τ . By Lemma 7, piτi = piτ ′i .
But then, consider i using another machine M ′i = {M ′ip, M˜ ′ip,M ′ir, M˜ ′ir} where, for
k = p, r, M ′ik = (Q
′
ik, q
1′
ik, λ
′
ik, µ
′
ik) and M˜
′
ik = (Q˜
′
ik, q˜
1′
ik, λ˜
′
ik, µ˜
′
ik). This machine is identical
to M∗i except that:
• qτi is dropped
• the transition function is such that µ˜′ik(q˜τ−1i , aτ−1) = qτ ′i (k ∈ {p, r}).
Since qτi 6= qti ∀t < τ , this preserves the outcome path up to τ − 1 while making the
path between τ ′ and τ − 1 repeat from τ on.
Similarly to the proof of Lemma 4 above, we can show that this will not change i’s
payoff. But, since qτi has been dropped, ‖M∗i ‖ > ‖M ′i‖. We thus have a contradiction
against NEMc.
(ii) This part can be proven similarly to (i) above. ‖
Proof of Lemma 9. Suppose not. So, suppose that qti = q
T
i for some i and some
t < T . Let z = (z1, z2) ∈ 42 be the agreement at T . There are two possible cases to
consider.
Case A: Player i is the proposer at T .
Define τ = min{t|qti = qTi }. By Lemma 7, piτj = piTj . Since there is an agreement on z
at T , we have piτj = zj.
Now consider player j using another machine M ′j = {M ′jp, M˜ ′jp,M ′jr, M˜ ′jr} where,
for p = k, r, M ′jk = (Q
′
jk, q
1′
jk, λ
′
jk, µ
′
jk) and M˜
′
jk = (Q˜
′
jk, q˜
1′
jk, λ˜
′
jk, µ˜
′
jk). This machine is
identical to M∗j except that:
• qτj is dropped (i.e. Q′jr = Q∗jr\qτj )
• the transition function is such that µ˜′jp(q˜τ−1j , aτ−1) = qTj .
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Since, by Lemma 8, qτj (as does q
τ
i by definition) appears for the first time at τ on
the original equilibrium path, this new machine (given M∗i ) generates an identical out-
come path as the original machine M∗j up to τ and then induces the agreement z at τ .
We know piτj = zj, and thus, it follows that pij(M
∗
i ,M
′
j) = pij(M
∗
i ,M
∗
j ). But since q
τ
j is
dropped, ‖M∗j ‖ > ‖M ′j‖. This contradicts NEMc.
Case B : Player i is the responder at T .
We can show contradiction similarly to Case A above. ‖
8 Appendix B: An Alternative Equilibrium Concept
The following defines the general preference ordering over machine profiles proposed by
Abreu and Rubinstein [1] (AR).
Definition 11 Let Âsi (and ∼si ) denote player i’s preference ordering over the set of
machines profiles. For any pair of machine profilesM = (Mi,M−i) andM ′ = (M ′i ,M
′
−i),
we have M Âsi M ′ if one of the following holds:
(i) pii(Mi,M−i) > pii(M ′i ,M
′
−i) and ||Mi|| ≤ ||M ′i ||
(ii) pii(Mi,M−i) ≥ pii(M ′i ,M ′−i) and ||Mi|| < ||M ′i || .
A Nash equilibrium can then be written in terms of machines that are most preferred
against each other.
Definition 12 A machine profile M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) constitutes a Nash equilibrium of the
machine game (NEM) if ∀i there exists no M ′i such that
(M ′i ,M
∗
−i) Âsi (M∗i ,M∗−i) .
The following Lemma extends Lemma 168.2 in Osborne and Rubinstein [15] (also
part (a) of AR’s Theorem 1) to the negotiation game. Any NEM must be such that each
player’s machine uses an equal number of states, and consequently, must correspond to
a Nash equilibrium of the negotiation game.
Lemma 10 Suppose either A is compact and ui(·) is continuous for all i, or A is finite.
Then, if M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEM, we have
(i) ||M∗1 || = ||M∗2 ||;
(ii) pii(M
∗) = max
fi∈Fi
pii(fi,M
∗
−i) ∀i.
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Proof. Consider machines in the 2SM specification. (The 4SM case can be treated
similarly.)
(i) Fix player j’s machineMj = {Mjp,Mjr} where, for l = p, r,Mjl = (Qjl, q1jl, λjl, µjl).
Then, consider player i solving his dynamic optimization problem for the machine game
ignoring complexity.
Let Sik define the set of player i’s one-period strategies in the extensive form game
that he plays in role k ∈ {p, r} every other period of the negotiation game. We denote
its element by sik ∈ Sik. Let vi(sik, sjl) denote player i’s (one-period) payoff given the
pair of strategies.
For each qtj ∈ Qjp ∪ Qjr, let Vi(qtj) = maxfi∈F ti pii(fi,Mj(qtj)) (where Mj(qtj) is j’s
machine starting with the sub-machine that is active in period t with initial state qtj).
Also, ∀qtj ∈ Qjp ∪Qjr, let Si(qtj) be the solution set to the problem
max
sik
{
vi(sik, λjl(q
t
j)) + δVi
(
µjl(q
t
j, sik)
)}
(23)
where k and l are the role of i and j in period t respectively. Then, i’s strategy is optimal
givenMj if and only if ∀qtj ∈ Qjp∪Qjr the one-period strategy it plays when j’s machine
is in state qtj belongs to Si(q
t
j).
21 (Existence is guaranteed if Sip and Sir are compact,
which is true if A is compact and ui(·) is continuous or if A is finite.)
Let s∗i (q
t
j) ∈ Si(qtj) denote an optimal one-period strategy for player i given qtj ∈
Qjp ∪Qjr. Also, let s∗i (qtj, d) be the action s∗i (qtj) induces at the partial history d.
Now, consider player i’s machine Mi = {Mip,Mir} defined as follows: ∀k, l, we set
Qik = Qjl, q
1
ik = q
1
jl, λik(qj, d) = s
∗
i (qj, d) ∀qj ∈ Qjl and ∀d ∈ Dik, and µik(qj, e) =
µjl(qj, e) ∀e ∈ E. This machine implements i’s best response to Mj using only the states
used by j’s machine.
Thus, if M∗ = (M∗1 ,M
∗
2 ) is a NEM profile, then ||M∗i || ≤ ||M∗−i|| ∀i. It follows that
||M∗1 || = ||M∗2 ||.
(ii) This follows from part (i). ‖
Lemma 10 connects our notion of NEMc (Definition 7) with AR’s equilibrium notion
(Definition 12). Effectively, both definitions take the set of Nash equilibria of the ne-
gotiation game and select outcomes that capture some measure of “trade-off” between
payoffs and complexity. In this sense, the equilibrium notions used in this paper closely
parallel those of AR.
21For the case of machines with a finite state space, this statement is established by the Blackwell’s
theorem. For the general (countable) state space case, which we consider in the paper, see Hinderer [12]
and the references therein.
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